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1
Presidential Selection: Historical, Institutional,
and Democratic Perspectives
James A. Gardner*

It has been nearly two centuries since an American presidential election has
evoked a crisis of conﬁdence like that following the election of 2016. Not since
the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 has there been such a public display of
anxiety concerning the methods by which we choose our chief executive. As in
the contest of 1828 pitting the Democrat Jackson against his Federalist opponent John Quincy Adams, the presidential nominating process of 2016 produced a contest between a celebrity populist, widely seen as unqualiﬁed by
experience or temperament, and a highly experienced and competent but
deeply uninspiring political insider who had been anointed by establishment
elites.
This anxiety ran deep in 2016: for the ﬁrst time in the quarter-century during
which such statistics have been recorded, neither major party candidate was
viewed favorably by even half the electorate.1 The emerging verdict appears to
be that our system for selecting presidential candidates failed catastrophically
in 2016, an impression many regard as conﬁrmed by the damage subsequently
inﬂicted on the ofﬁce of the presidency and on our democratic institutions by
the winner, Donald Trump. In offering a wide variety of suggestions about
how to improve the nominating process, the contributors to this volume
endorse the proposition that our presidential selection procedures now operate
poorly and are in need of repair, if not wholesale rethinking.
Meaningful criticism of the current process requires, however, that existing
procedures be judged against some baseline of what constitutes a good candidate selection process, yielding good candidates who, one presumes,
*
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James A. Gardner is Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor at the
University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New York. He thanks Matt Steilen,
Rick Su, Guyora Binder, and David McNamee for useful comments on a prior draft.
William G. Mayer, Was the Process to Blame? Why Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Won
Their Parties’ Presidential Nominations, 93 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 759 (2018).
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subsequently go on to become good presidents. If the current system works
poorly, in other words, how should a good system of presidential nomination
work? What kind of candidates should it produce, and how ought it to be
structured so as to produce them? What kinds of improvements are needed,
and how, if at all, can we obtain them? To address these questions, this chapter
draws on three potential sources of guidance—history, institutional analysis,
and democratic theory—and yields four broad conclusions.
First, an examination of the evolution of presidential nominating procedures since the founding reveals a steady historical trend of convergence in the
identities of two critically important groups: the selectorate—the group authorized to choose ofﬁcially recognized nominees2—and the electorate—the
group that chooses the ultimate ofﬁceholder from among the nominees.
Second, this convergence is signiﬁcant because the design of nominating
procedures has important consequences for the kinds of candidates likely to
emerge as nominees. Third, although democratic theory can help a polity
clarify the values it wishes its democratic institutions to promote, a turn to
democratic theory does not relieve a polity of the antecedent need to make
hard choices about its goals and commitments, which must come before it
makes its hard choices about institutional design. Finally, although law is
useful and important in structuring a presidential nominating process, citizen
ethos—the collective internalization of consensual democratic norms—may
well be the single most important factor necessary to the consistent production
of high-quality presidential candidates.
I. EXPANSION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTORATE

A. The Founding Era (1788–1799)
How to choose a president proved to be the most difﬁcult issue the
Philadelphia Convention addressed. After several false starts and lengthy
debate, the Founders ﬁnally settled on a system that soon pleased no one—
the Electoral College. Conceived as an intermediate body of wise and virtuous
men who would stand between the people and the presidency, the members of
the Electoral College were meant to exercise a kind of Burkean trusteeship in
which they would base their selection of a president on “the information and
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations”3—that is, on their
2
3

See, e.g., R EUVEN Y. H AZAN & G IDEON R AHAT , D EMOCRACY WITHIN P ARTIES : C ANDIDATE
S ELECTION M ETHODS AND T HEIR P OLITICAL C ONSEQUENCES 33–54 (2010).
T HE F EDERALIST , No. 68 (Hamilton).
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own sound, informed, and independent judgment. In so doing, the Electoral
College would protect the people against their own human weakness and
potentially poor judgment by assuring that excessively ambitious men, skilled
in “low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity,”4 would never attain the
nation’s highest ofﬁce.
Interestingly, the Founders did not give much thought to the question of
how qualiﬁed candidates for the presidency would come to the attention of the
Electoral College. They did not provide for any system of nomination, nor did
they grant the Electoral College any ofﬁcial authority to create one in the
event that such a system should prove desirable. Instead, they seemed to
assume that the nation’s leading candidates for the presidency would simply
be known, either personally or by reputation,5 to the members of the Electoral
College—a reasonable assumption, perhaps, in a world in which the ruling
elite in any state might have numbered in the dozens, or at most, in the
hundreds.6
In this system, where nominations for the presidency were to be selfgenerated by the same body authorized to elect the president, the selectorate
was precisely co-extensive with the electorate. Such an arrangement, the
Framers believed, would be most conducive to the election of presidents
with the desired characteristics, namely, “preeminen[ce] for ability and
virtue.”7 Certainly, the Founders would never have contemplated assigning
the nominating function to political parties, an institution they considered
detestably self-interested and factional, and indeed hoped would never appear
on the American political landscape.8
B. The First Party System (1800–1824)
In less than two decades, of course, parties did appear on the scene, and they
were quickly integrated into the presidential selection process. Parties of the
Jeffersonian era were not like their modern counterparts; they did not conceive
of themselves as representing a subset of the populace whose goal was to offer
4
5
6

7
8

Id.
J AMES W. C EASER , P RESIDENTIAL S ELECTION : T HEORY AND D EVELOPMENT 66, 83 (1979).
For example, due to property qualiﬁcations, the number of people eligible to serve as governor
of South Carolina under its 1778 constitution was probably twenty-ﬁve or fewer.
James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of
State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 T EX . L. R EV . 1219, 1273 n.275
(1998).
T HE F EDERALIST , No. 68 (Hamilton).
R ICHARD H OFSTADTER , T HE I DEA OF A P ARTY S YSTEM : T HE R ISE OF L EGITIMATE
O PPOSITION IN THE U NITED S TATES , 1780–1840, at 9 (1970).
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to the electorate a political vision or set of programmatic alternatives in a fair
and equal competition for voter approval. Instead, parties of this era conceived
of themselves as parties “of the whole people, not of any part or of any
minority.”9 The Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, in particular, thought
of themselves as embodying the original, animating spirit of the revolutionary
nation, a spirit that they believed required restoration following what they
viewed as the subversion of the established constitutional order by the
Federalists during the administration of John Adams. Self-organization into
parties, for the Jeffersonians, was an unpleasant but temporary expedient that
could be abandoned following successful restoration of the true revolutionary
order.10
To accomplish this task, the Jeffersonians deliberately exploited weaknesses
in the design of the Electoral College to transform it into a vehicle of partisan
mobilization. Their plan had two parts. First, they pre-selected their presidential candidate on partisan grounds, and through ground-level political activity
promoted as candidates for the Electoral College individuals already committed to the party’s candidate, an action that transformed members of the
Electoral College into “instructed agents, not deliberative trustees.”11 Second,
they de facto replaced the Electoral College as the instrument of candidate
nomination with a newly devised, shadow organization, the congressional
caucus. These caucuses consisted of informal meetings of members of
Congress who shared party membership; at these caucuses, participants
reached consensus on the identity of the party’s candidate for the
presidency.12 The caucus choice went on to win the presidency in every
election from 1800 to 1816.13
As a functional matter, the caucus system thus substituted the congressional caucus for the Electoral College as the nominating selectorate. As
a result of this change, “[t]he ideological orthodoxy of the candidates . . .
became a decisive criterion for selection, while competence, virtue, and

9
10
11
12

13

A LFRED D E G RAZIA , P UBLIC AND R EPUBLIC 114 (reprint ed. 1985) (orig. ed. 1951).
C EASER . supra note 5, at 91; G ERALD L EONARD , T HE I NVENTION OF P ARTY P OLITICS 22–25
(2002).
C EASER , supra note 5, at 88.
Emmett H. Buell, Jr., Presidential Nominations of the Pre-Convention Era, in E NDURING
C ONTROVERSIES IN P RESIDENTIAL N OMINATING P OLITICS 35–38 (Emmett H. Buell, Jr. &
William G. Mayer eds., 2004); William G. Morgan, The Origin and Development of the
Congressional Caucus, in E NDURING C ONTROVERSIES , supra, at 60.
Stephen Gardbaum & Richard H. Pildes, Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of
Selecting Candidates for Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 647, 653 (2018).
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service to the state—the Founders’ intended criteria—receded into the
background.”14
C. The Second Party System (1828–1912)
The emergence of the Democratic party and the successful election of its 1828
candidate for president, Andrew Jackson, permanently and dramatically changed the American system of presidential selection in two important ways. First,
under the ideological leadership of Martin Van Buren, Jacksonian Democrats
developed for the ﬁrst time a justiﬁcation for a system of permanent party
competition. Such a system, they contended, would institutionalize popular
sovereignty by ensuring, ﬁrst, that the people would always have a ready
alternative to the government in power; and second, that they could hold
incumbents accountable by voting them out and voting into power the
opposition party. Second, Jacksonian Democrats advanced a very different
conception of the presidency: the president, they claimed, was the only ofﬁcial
in the United States who represented, and was accountable to, the entirety of
the populace. To ensure presidential responsiveness to the appropriate constituency, the process of selecting presidential candidates had to be committed
to a “mass” party of nationwide scale15 whose members possessed a strong voice
in the nominating process.
Jacksonian Democrats made good on these commitments by transferring
the power to nominate from the congressional caucus to a national party
convention.16 In this system, each party nominated its candidate at
a national convention whose members were party delegates chosen principally
by state and local party organizations to represent their membership. During
the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, the actual selection of
convention delegates was typically made directly by state and local party
leaders, who consequently exercised a great deal of control over the course
of the convention and the ultimate nomination.17 The selectorate, in this
system, thus comprised convention delegates hand-picked by local party
bosses.

14
15
16
17

C EASER , supra note 5, at 96.
J OHN A LDRICH , W HY P ARTIES ?: T HE O RIGIN AND T RANSFORMATION OF P OLITICAL P ARTIES
IN A MERICA 97–98 (1995).
Emmett H. Buell, Jr., The National Nominating Convention, in E NDURING C ONTROVERSIES ,
supra note 12, at 79.
Gardbaum & Pildes, supra note 13, at 654.
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D. The Progressive Era (1912–1972)
The Progressive movement arose in the 1880s, reaching the height of its
inﬂuence in the early twentieth century. In their political views, Progressives
echoed the founding-era distaste for political parties, but on different grounds:
they viewed parties as captives of local machine bosses and corrupted by
corporate interests for the beneﬁt of the wealthy. As a result, on the
Progressive view, parties had collaborated in bending government policies
away from their true purpose—service to the common good—and toward
a clientelistic system of local plunder of public assets. At the same time,
Progressives saw the presidency as requiring enormous power in the modern
world, and indeed as the one organ of government most capable of operating
effectively in a dangerous world that often required swift and energetic
national action, and in a manner genuinely responsive to mass public opinion.
Progressives implemented these views by leading a successful movement to
require parties to nominate candidates through the use of direct primary
elections. First introduced in 1899, when the Minnesota legislature enacted
direct primaries for Minneapolis local elections,18 the use of primary elections
spread quickly: by 1916 over half the states utilized some form of primary, and
by 1958 primary elections were nearly universally available,19 though not
always mandatory.
The movement toward primary elections continued a trend of expanding
the nominating selectorate. From the members of the Electoral College, to
the members of a congressional caucus, to delegates to a nationwide party
convention, the presidential selectorate now increasingly included the rank
and ﬁle membership of national political parties.
E. Consolidation of the Mass Selectorate: The 1970s Reforms and Beyond
By the mid-twentieth century, although most states offered the option of
nomination by direct primary, parties were not necessarily required to select
convention delegates according to the results of primary elections. Instead, the
route to a party’s presidential nomination typically lay through a mixed system
in which candidates still had to seek privately the personal support of party

18

19

R OBERT G. B OATWRIGHT , C ONGRESSIONAL P RIMARY E LECTIONS 27 (2014). There is some
disagreement about where and when the ﬁrst primary was introduced. Masket, for example,
places it in Wisconsin in 1904. S ETH M ASKET , T HE I NEVITABLE P ARTY : W HY A TTEMPTS TO
K ILL THE P ARTY S YSTEM F AIL AND H OW T HEY W EAKEN D EMOCRACY 127 (2016).
B OATWRIGHT , supra note 18, at 27.
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leaders, but could sometimes help their case by demonstrating their ability to
win votes in advisory primary elections.20
This system was replaced, almost at a stroke, following the divisive 1968
Democratic convention in Chicago. There, while anti-Vietnam War protests
were violently suppressed by the local political boss, Chicago Mayor Richard
Daley, the convention proceeded to nominate the establishment, pro-war
candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, passing over a highly popular,
anti-war candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy. In response to the subsequent
outcry from many quarters within the party—and the party’s crushing defeat at
the hands of Richard Nixon—the Democratic Party created the McGovernFraser Commission to recommend changes to the party’s presidential selection procedure for the 1972 election. The Commission’s principal charge was
to recommend ways to improve representation at the convention of previously
excluded groups, including women, minorities, and young people.21
The Commission responded with recommendations to open up the process
by decreasing the proportion of convention delegates chosen directly by party
leaders, requiring transparency in the selection of delegates, and imposing
quotas that would increase the diversity of convention delegations. The Party
adopted these recommendations, leaving the mode of compliance to state
party organizations. In an unforeseen development, state parties—joined in
many cases by state legislatures through the exercise of their Article II power to
direct the manner of appointment of presidential electors—complied by
moving to an almost entirely plebiscitary system of delegate selection through
direct primary elections.22 The Republican Party soon followed suit, in many
cases under compulsion of state legislation. The changes were dramatic; as
Gardbaum and Pildes explain, “[i]In 1968, the primaries had bound 36% of the
delegates to each convention; just four years later, the primaries bound 58% of
the Democratic delegates and 41% of the Republican ones, and by 1976, twothirds of the Democrat delegates and more than half the Republican ones were
bound.”23 Thus, by the late-twentieth century, the presidential selectorate had
come to comprise essentially the entirety of the national parties’ rank and ﬁle
membership.24
20
21
22
23
24

Gardbaum & Pildes, supra note 13, at 655–56.
C EASER , supra note 5, at 277–84.
Gardbaum & Pildes, supra note 13, at 659.
Id.
Political scientists disagree over the extent to which the move to direct primaries gave control
over nominations to the party rank and ﬁle. According to one view, party elites continue to
exercise a great degree of de facto control over the identity of nominees. See, e.g., Hans
J. G. Hassell, Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Inﬂuence in Nominations for the U.S.
Senate, 78 J. P OL . 75 (2015). Others, however, argue that the inclusiveness of nominating
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Even this, however, did not represent the conclusion of the trend of expansion of the selectorate. In subsequent decades, some states began to experiment with opening up their primary elections beyond party rank and ﬁle. In
a “semi-closed” primary, used by some parties for at least some ofﬁces in more
than a dozen states, independent voters—those who have chosen not to
afﬁliate formally with any party—may nevertheless vote in primary elections.
In such a primary, the selectorate thus consists of the party rank and ﬁle plus
any independent voters who choose to participate. In an “open” primary, used
by some parties for some ofﬁces in more than twenty states, voters may vote in
any party’s primary, even if they have registered as members of a different
party. In these primaries, the selectorate is expanded to include not only the
party’s rank and ﬁle, but also members of opposing parties. And in a “nonpartisan” primary, used in California, Washington, and Louisiana, all voters,
regardless of prior registration, may vote for any candidate of any party. The
two candidates with the most votes then run against each other in the general
election, regardless of their partisan afﬁliation. In this kind of primary, the
selectorate consists in principle of the entire electorate.25
Moreover, in response to dissatisfaction within the Democratic party over
the 2016 nomination process, especially from supporters of Senator Bernie
Sanders, the chief competitor to Hillary Clinton, the national Democratic
Party recently announced it will consider further empowering the rank and ﬁle
by reducing the role of “superdelegates” at the national convention. These

25

processes has contributed to the creation of a candidate-centered politics in which alliances of
candidates and their supporters effectively control the nominating process. See, e.g., H AZAN &
R AHAT , supra note 2, at 148, 151. Some go even further, and argue that the polarity of party
inﬂuence has reversed itself: instead of parties dictating the commitments of their nominees, it
is candidates who now set the agenda to which their parties must then conform. See, e.g.,
Richard S. Katz, The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy, 7 P ARTY
P OL . 277, 278 (2001); Austin Ranney, Candidate Selection, in D EMOCRACY AT THE P OLLS :
A C OMPARATIVE S TUDY OF C OMPETITIVE N ATIONAL E LECTIONS 103 (David Butler et al. eds.
1981); Gerald C. Wright, Rules and the Ideological Character of Primary Electorates, in
R EFORMING THE P RESIDENTIAL N OMINATION P ROCESS 24 (Steven S. Smith & Melanie
J. Springer eds., 2009).
Another kind of primary, the so-called “blanket” primary, was invalidated by the Supreme
Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). In a blanket primary, every
voter may vote in the primary election for any candidate of any party. The candidate of each
party with the most votes is declared that party’s nominee for purposes of the general election.
The difference between a blanket and non-partisan primary is that in a blanket primary, each
party is forced to include in its selectorate all other voters, a feature that the Court viewed as an
unconstitutional interference with the right of party members to choose with whom to
associate. In a non-partisan primary, in contrast, parties are stripped of the right to nominate
candidates onto the general election ballot, so no party, in the Court’s view, is forced to
associate with anyone against its will in choosing a nominee.
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delegates, who comprised about 15 percent of convention delegates in 2016,
consist of party leaders and insiders whose presence at the convention had
been thought to provide some ballast in the form of expertise and political
experience.
In the march from semi-closed, to open, to non-partisan primary elections,
the selectorate progressively becomes broader and broader to the point that it
begins to converge with the electorate. History is thus in a sense circling back
upon itself. During the founding era, the electorate and selectorate coincided,
but both were extremely narrow in scope; in today’s system, the electorate and
selectorate also coincide, or nearly so, but both are broad-based, with the
selectorate seemingly on a path soon to converge fully with the electorate. In
the founding era version, nomination and election were the province of elites
and party insiders, and non-elites and rank-and-ﬁle party members were
excluded. Under today’s system, nomination and election are the almost
exclusive province of the mass electorate, and it is experienced, senior members of the party who lack a formal voice in the nominating process—a
development that has been called, tellingly, the decline of “peer review.”26
II. INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF NOMINATING PROCEDURES

The United States is today a polity of more than 300 million, spread over
thousands of miles of territory and, for purposes of presidential election,
divided by law into 51 separate political communities. Because such an entity
is incapable of spontaneously generating plausible candidates for national
political ofﬁce, some procedure for nominating candidates is therefore
required. By nominating procedure, I mean simply mechanisms, established
by law or by rules adopted by an ofﬁcially recognized nominating entity, such
as a political party, that distinguish candidates authorized to stand for ofﬁce
from those who are not. Moreover, because we want our presidents to be good
ones, any procedure for generating presidential candidates should select them
for the qualities we most wish our presidents to possess. The issue to which
I now turn is the effect of nominating procedures on the characteristics
possessed by candidates who successfully clear the hurdle of obtaining
a nomination.
Variations in nominating procedures can in principle exert a triple screening effect on candidate characteristics. First, simply by establishing procedural
26

The term dates at least to the 1980s. See Elaine C. Kamarck, Returning Peer Review to the
American Presidential Nomination Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 709 (2018).
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requirements to obtain nomination, they can inﬂuence at the outset who
might be tempted even to attempt a presidential run. Second, by manipulating
the identity of the selectorate, nominating procedures tend to prescreen for the
kinds of individuals who are most capable of making a successful appeal to the
body doing the nominating. Third, by establishing the criteria that deﬁne
the selectorate, and that distinguish one selectorate from another, nominating
procedures can inﬂuence the substantive grounds along which the eventual
candidates differentiate themselves.
A. Self-Screening Effects
Perhaps the most immediate impact of nominating procedures is their power
to induce self-screening among potential candidates. The mere establishment
of any set of nominating procedures will tend to attract candidates who are—or
at least who think they are—more likely to succeed under the established
procedures, and to deter those who are less likely to prosper under whatever
procedures happen to prevail. For example, something as basic as a long
primary season will tend to attract candidates who possess the physical robustness and mental and emotional stamina to traverse the entire process—characteristics in our day often spoken of, sometimes approvingly and sometimes
not, as “ﬁre in the belly.” Potential candidates, even those well-qualiﬁed for
the presidency on other grounds, are conversely likely to be deterred from
attempting to run in a process that they suspect they will be either unlikely or
unwilling to complete. Similarly, a nominating procedure that is expensive
will tend to deter candidates who either do not possess or are unwilling to
invest, substantial personal resources; or who are not well-positioned, either for
lack of connections, pre-nomination public support, or native fund-raising
ability, to raise the money necessary to make a presidential run.
B. The Nature of Appeals to the Selectorate
Selectorates may be deﬁned in many different ways, for many different
reasons, but one inevitable effect of deﬁning a selectorate is to establish the
characteristics of the group to which potential presidential candidates must
appeal in order to secure nomination.27 As a result, nominating procedures
will tend to screen in candidates who possess personal characteristics that
allow them to appeal successfully to the relevant selectorate, and to screen out
those who lack the characteristics or ability to make such appeals.
27

See C EASER , supra note 5, at 18, 233; see also id. at 55, 62, 119.
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This can have potentially signiﬁcant consequences for the qualities possessed by candidates, because different qualities may be necessary to appeal
successfully to different selectorates, depending on their composition. For
example, if the selectorate is a congressional caucus, then the successful
candidate must be able to appeal to sitting members of Congress, an elite
group that is unusually well-informed about the qualities necessary for presidential success. Different characteristics and abilities, on the other hand,
may be necessary to appeal successfully to a selectorate consisting of the entire
party membership, the party activist base, local party bosses, rich donors, or
other groups. Indeed, a common complaint about the current process of party
nominations is that different qualities are necessary to appeal successfully to
the party rank and ﬁle when seeking the nomination than are required to
appeal to the electorate as a whole when running for the actual ofﬁce.28
C. Substantive Grounds of Nomination and Election
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, nominating procedures establish the
cleavages along which the choice of nominees will be made, thus inﬂuencing
the issues that will be salient not only in the eventual choice of nominees, but in
the general election. The mechanism—unintended but inevitable—works like
this. The establishment of nominating procedures includes deﬁning the selectorate. If the system divides the polity into multiple selectorates, each of which is
authorized to put forward nominees—if, that is, the bodies that do the nominating comprise some subset of the body that does the electing—then some criterion
will necessarily deﬁne the various selectorates, distinguishing them from one
another. The criteria that distinguish one selectorate from another in turn will
then inﬂuence (though they need not fully determine) the criteria by which
competing selectorates choose their nominees. And this in turn will inﬂuence the
qualities that distinguish the nominees from one another in the general election,
thereby inﬂuencing the grounds on which they are chosen by the electorate.
This phenomenon may be easiest to see by analogy to a more familiar one:
dividing the electorate into legislative districts.29 Tip O’Neill, Speaker of the
28

29

Richard Nixon reportedly offered the following advice to Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican
candidate for President: “you have to run as far as you can to the right [during the primaries]
because that’s where 40% of the people who decide the nomination are. And to get elected you
have to run as fast as you can back to the middle, because only about 4% of the nation’s voters
are on the extreme right wing.” Jack Nelson, Letters from Nixon Shape Dole’s Campaign
Strategy, L.A. T IMES , May 7, 1995.
Here I draw on an argument made in James A. Gardner, How to Do Things with Boundaries:
Redistricting and the Construction of Politics, 11 E LECTION L.J. 399 (2012).
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U.S. House of Representatives from 1977 to 1987, famously quipped that “all
politics is local.”30 O’Neill was accurate, but as political theorist Andrew
Rehfeld subsequently observed, all politics is local only because we draw
legislative districts territorially. If we drew districts based on occupation,
Rehfeld argued, then “all politics would be ‘vocational.’”31 The important
point is that in a contestatory political system, the contest often, even usually,
will be won or lost along the cleavages that deﬁne the sorting of voters,32 and
the identity of those issue cleavages can be managed—or manipulated—in the
process of drawing the districts.
The same holds for the process by which we divide the nationwide
presidential electorate into competing selectorates, which might usefully
be conceived as a kind of electoral “districting.” If, for example, we deﬁned
selectorates by gender, with men entitled to nominate one candidate and
women another, issues related to gender would be much more likely than
under the present system regularly to rise to prominence in the nomination process. If selectorates were designated by race, ethnicity, or language,
then those issues would likely be highly salient in the nominating and
electoral phases. If the selectorates corresponded to income groupings—
say, for example, the rich got to nominate one candidate, the middle class
another, and so on—then issues of economic class would likely predominate in the selection of nominees. The point, again, is that the criteria
used to deﬁne the selectorates will inﬂuence the cleavages that divide the
candidates at the nomination phase, and thus the nature of the issues that
confront the electorate in the general election. Thus, how we nominate
inﬂuences not just the personal characteristics of the candidates, but the
grounds on which they are likely to compete ﬁrst for nomination, and then
for election.
As it happens, we have for more than two hundred years assigned the job of
producing nominations to national political parties, organizations that generally
tend to distinguish themselves—at least in theory—along a spectrum of political
ideology. By deﬁning the selectorate in ideological terms, our system thus tends
to produce—and, one presumes, is intended to produce—nominees who are
distinguished from one another mainly on the basis of their ideological and
programmatic commitments, thus presenting the electorate with a choice lying
30
31
32

T HOMAS P. O’N EILL , A LL P OLITICS I S L OCAL AND O THER R ULES OF THE G AME (1993).
A NDREW R EHFELD , T HE C ONCEPT OF C ONSTITUENCY : P OLITICAL R EPRESENTATION ,
D EMOCRATIC L EGITIMACY , AND I NSTITUTIONAL D ESIGN 8 (2005).
Thomas W. Pogge, Self-Constituting Constituencies to Enhance Freedom, Equality, and
Participation in Democratic Procedures, 49 T HEORIA 26, 49 (2002); L ANI G UINIER , T HE
T YRANNY OF THE M AJORITY 101 (1994).
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along that axis. Although from many perspectives it may be desirable to design
a system that tends to force voters into choosing among candidates on ideological grounds, ideology is not the only criterion salient to presidential success.
Section D below takes up the question of whether it is possible to deﬁne
selectorates so as to generate candidates who distinguish themselves along
other salient dimensions.
D. Congruence of Selectorate and Electorate
As discussed earlier, a strong historical trend in the evolution of presidential
nominating procedures has produced a growing convergence between presidential selectorates and the presidential electorate, with the former slowly
expanding toward the boundaries of the latter. In light of the analysis set out
above, what is the likely effect of such convergence on the grounds upon
which selectorates nominate and electorates subsequently elect?
When the selectorate and the electorate are congruent, the potential beneﬁts of deliberate institutional design are nulliﬁed: the system fails to nudge
the choice of candidates into any particular orientation, so the choice of
nominees is no longer channeled along any particular set of criteria or along
any cleavage upon which the electorate might reasonably be thought—or
hoped—to divide. As a result, nominations can much more easily be made
upon any ground, whether or not relevant to the qualities presidential nominees ought to possess. Control over the criteria of nomination—that is to say,
the advantage associated with the power to set the agenda—is thus abandoned
by the polity and in a sense delegated to the discretion of individual actors
within the system.
Consider, for example, a small committee or board the rules of which
permit nominations for ofﬁcers to be made by any member, without restriction. In those circumstances, the grounds for nomination will be determined
entirely by the discretion of individual members. Board members might
nominate on the basis of competence or experience, but they might just as
easily nominate on the basis of family ties, personal friendship, hope of
personal gain, race, gender, or religion. Any constraints on the grounds of
nomination, if they exist at all, will be supplied by informal norms of the
group, and the constraining effect of those norms will depend entirely on the
willingness of members to observe them.33

33

Hazan and Rahat argue that the inclusiveness of American parties’ procedures for selecting
legislative candidates is responsible for reducing party discipline within legislatures. Reuven
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It is worth recalling here that the Framers designed the Electoral College, in
which the selectorate and electorate coincided, for the express purpose of
impeding nomination on the basis of partisan ideology. Such a system, they
hoped, would promote selection on the basis of national reputation,
a reputation they felt could be earned only by individuals of great virtue and
ability and little personal ambition, on the model of a Patriot King,
Cincinnatus, or George Washington.34 But that reputation, they clearly
believed, would be based on personal, non-partisan, non-ideological characteristics of the candidates. The Electoral College might have worked that way
had the informal norms of the group remained stable. Those norms, however,
changed radically when the Jeffersonians captured the process for electing
members of the Electoral College and converted it into a system highly
responsive to partisan considerations.
Moreover, even if the Framers were correct that congruence between the
selectorate and electorate is likely to produce nominees with national reputations, the modern selectorate is very different from the Founding-era Electoral
College, and changes in technology and political and social norms have
drastically altered what it means to have a “national reputation,” as well as
the grounds upon which such a reputation can be made and the kinds of
people who are capable of developing such a reputation. “Celebrity,” in all its
modern forms, simply did not exist in that era. In any case, both history and
institutional logic demonstrate that congruence of the selectorate and the
electorate creates institutional conditions in which the grounds of nomination
are neither pressured by design incentives to lie along any particular axis of
choice nor easily controlled by post-design regulatory measures.
E. The Need for Intentional Design
The foregoing historical and institutional analyses demonstrate, if nothing
else, that a presidential nominating system might be built in many ways, and
that details of design can exert some degree of inﬂuence—perhaps
a considerable inﬂuence—on the criteria by which nominations are made,
the qualities and characteristics of the nominees and ultimate ofﬁceholders,
and even the grounds upon which the presidency is contested. There is thus
no “natural” or even “best” way to structure a presidential nominating

34

Y. Hazan & Gideon Rahat, Candidate Selection: Methods and Consequences, in H ANDBOOK
P ARTY P OLITICS 116–17 (Richard S. Katz & William Crotty eds., 2006).
See Henry St. John Bolingbroke, The Idea of a Patriot King (1738); R ALPH K ETCHUM ,
P RESIDENTS ABOVE P ARTY : T HE F IRST A MERICAN P RESIDENCY , 1789–1829, at 89 (1984).
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procedure. On the contrary, the way such a system operates is highly contingent on its design, and it is therefore essential that a polity designing such
a system for itself makes a clear and deliberate choice about the qualities it
wants its candidates to possess, and then to build a nominating system adapted
as well as possible to generating nominations of persons with those qualities.
But if, at the end of the day, we must make these kinds of hard choices,
how should we do so? On what basis? Because nomination is an element of
what has become a largely democratic process, one place to turn for assistance in making, or at least narrowing, the ﬁeld of choices is democratic
theory.
III. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRESIDENTIAL
CHARACTERISTICS

Over time, as we have seen, the process of presidential selection has become
increasingly democratic, even plebiscitary. Since the founding, popular participation has increased dramatically during both the nomination phase, following the turn to direct primary elections, and during the election phase,
following the conversion of the Electoral College into an institution that
passes through, as far as its structure will allow, nationwide popular sentiment
as expressed at the polls. To the extent that the process of presidential selection
is democratic, then, democratic theory might offer some guidance about how
best to structure it.
The guidance it offers, however, is limited. First, there are many competing theories of democracy, and each theory emphasizes different values and
aspects of democratic practice. Consequently, democratic theory cannot
deﬁnitively settle questions about democratic structure and practice,
although it can help clarify the values among which polities must choose
when designing democratic institutions. Second, most theories of democracy now in circulation do not readily generate concrete prescriptions for
operationalizing their own commitments, so it is difﬁcult to take guidance
from them in designing appropriate implementing institutions. Third, even
when democratic theories generate adequately speciﬁc prescriptions, those
prescriptions often suffer from serious problems of infeasibility in actual
implementation.
A. Varieties of Democratic Theory
“Democratic theory” is far from monolithic: many theories of democracy
currently circulate. Below are a few of the most common.
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 P ROTECTIVE D EMOCRACY . From the time of the founding, one of the
most common justiﬁcations for democratic forms of government is a set of
theories that can be captured under the broad heading of “protective
democracy.”35 Although the details sometimes vary, theories of protective
democracy usually center on two core beliefs: that the ultimate purpose of
government is to protect the rights and liberties of the citizenry; and that
democracy is a form of government particularly well suited to accomplish
that goal.
 D EVELOPMENTAL D EMOCRACY . Generally associated with thinkers such
as Mill36 and, later, with participationists such as Pateman and Barber,37
theories of developmental democracy hold that the most important
function of democracy is its capacity, by creating opportunities for
popular participation in self-governance, to foster and maintain in the
populace the skills of citizenship. These skills are critical because, as
Mill wrote, “human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of
others, in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, selfprotecting; and they only achieve a high degree of success in [that]
struggle . . ., in proportion as they are self-dependent, relying on what
they themselves can do, . . . rather than on what others can do for
them.”38
 D EMOCRATIC M INIMALISM . Pioneered by the mid-twentieth-century
political theorist Joseph Schumpeter, democratic minimalism holds
that “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”39 On this view, the
polity is fundamentally a passive observer of the political activities of
elites, and its capacity to inﬂuence public affairs is limited to replacing
one set of rulers with another.
 A GGREGATIVE T HEORIES . More sophisticated versions of minimalism,
aggregative or economic theories of democracy rest on the utilitarian
premise that the good of society is achieved through the maximization
of collective welfare. Democracy, in such theories, performs this function
when parties and candidates offer competing programmatic commitments and voters then choose among the options by voting for the
35
36
37
38
39

D AVID H ELD , M ODELS OF D EMOCRACY (1987).
J OHN S TUART M ILL , C ONSIDERATIONS ON R EPRESENTATIVE G OVERNMENT (1861).
C AROLE P ATEMAN , P ARTICIPATION AND D EMOCRATIC T HEORY (1970); B ENJAMIN B ARBER ,
S TRONG D EMOCRACY (1984).
M ILL , supra note 36, ch. III.
J OSEPH S CHUMPETER , C APITALISM , S OCIALISM AND D EMOCRACY 260 (1942).
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candidate whose policy commitments will provide them with the greatest
beneﬁts.40 Through the operation of forces similar to those prevailing in
well-functioning markets, social utility is said to be maximized through
the mechanical aggregation of the uncoordinated, self-interested decisions of voters.
 D ELIBERATIVE T HEORIES . The most recent entry into the ﬁeld, deliberative theories of democracy reject the minimalist and aggregative premises
that citizens have limited capacity to participate meaningfully in politics;
and reject the contention that politics consists of the mere summing of
individual utility preferences. Harkening back to earlier, thicker conceptions of democracy, deliberativists contend that citizens’ preferences, and
even their political self-understandings and identities, are formed in
reasoned, self-conscious, and deliberative processes of political engagement; and that only viewpoints formed in this fashion are entitled to full
consideration in the process by which a democratic society decides how
best to govern itself.41

***
Each of these theories of democracy emphasizes different democratic values
and aspects of democratic practice, and each thus offers distinct guidance as to
the qualities that presidents and presidential candidates ought to possess. For
example, under a theory of protective democracy, the most important quality
a presidential candidate must possess would seem to be a substantive commitment to individual liberty. Aggregative theories, in contrast, seem to demand
presidential candidates capable of balancing and adjusting competing voter
preferences—a kind of talent for brokering.42 Under deliberative theories, in
contrast, the ideal presidential candidate would presumably be a skilled deliberator capable of leading the citizenry through a process of meaningful
deliberation, who would respect, and exercise self-restraint in the face of, the
outcomes of meaningful public deliberation.
For this reason, a turn to democratic theory cannot settle disputes over the
qualities that presidential candidates ought to possess. It can, however, clarify
the available choices and their consequences, and might therefore usefully
assist a polity in recognizing those aspects of democracy that it most values and
40
41

42

A NTHONY D OWNS , A N E CONOMIC T HEORY OF D EMOCRACY (1957).
See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in T HE G OOD P OLITY :
N ORMATIVE A NALYSIS OF THE S TATE (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds. 1989);
J ÜRGEN H ABERMAS , B ETWEEN F ACTS AND N ORMS : C ONTRIBUTIONS TO A D ISCOURSE
T HEORY OF L AW AND D EMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
See C EASER , supra note 5, at 158.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University at Buffalo Libraries, on 02 Aug 2021 at 14:36:30, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108883870.002

Perspectives on Presidential Selection

27

wishes to advance in its democratic institutions and practices. This may not be
an easy task. First, no general consensus exists as to the descriptive accuracy,
normative attractiveness, or pragmatic feasibility of any of these theories, so
there is no default preference that might be invoked in the face of disagreement. Second, the process of choosing among democratic theories is complicated by the fact that the various theories have acquired over time a distinct
ideological valence, even a partisan one: present-day conservatives and libertarians tend to gravitate toward protective and aggregative theories of democracy, while liberals tend to prefer developmental and deliberative conceptions.
Thus, any enterprise of attempting to choose, in a sober, constitutional mode,
among foundational democratic theories runs the risk of activating the habitual partisan cleavages of ordinary politics.
The need for afﬁrmative choice is all the more urgent, however, because not
all of these characteristics are equally likely to reside in the same individual.
Aggregative brokering, for example, is in a sense the precise opposite of
deliberative consensus-building. Brokering among competing interests
requires facilitating logrolling and compromise, a task undertaken most effectively by according unquestioned validity to the merits of participants’
demands and underlying beliefs. Deliberative consensus-building, on the
other hand, requires leading participants through a process of potentially
transformative self-reﬂection and self-interrogation as a means to achieving
consensus. Thus, a willingness to take guidance from democratic theory
cannot relieve us of the necessity of making hard choices about normative
ends. Instead, it tends simply to push those choices down a level, converting
them from choices about the desired qualities of presidential candidates to
choices among competing conceptions of democratic practice.
B. Prescriptive Vagueness
Even if societal agreement on a theory of democracy is feasible, theories of
democracy often have surprisingly little to say about how best to operationalize
their own normative commitments. This is in part a consequence of the
historic focus of democratic theory since the Enlightenment: the legitimacy
of governmental authority. The great problem to which the Enlightenment
political project addressed itself was undermining divine providence as the
basis of governmental—which is to say, monarchical—authority, and refounding it on popular consent. As a result, democratic theories are typically, at
bottom, theories of popular sovereignty in which the principal concern is
whether the power exercised by rulers is legitimate, in the sense of authorized
by popular consent.
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Because of this focus, democratic theory often has little to say about how
principles of popular sovereignty are operationalized. Consistent with the idea
that the will of the popular sovereign must be formed freely, theories of
democracy tend to assume a wide range of acceptable structural choices,
and a correspondingly wide range of discretion among polities to choose
a form of operationalization that best suits their goals and habits. No theory
of democracy, for example, is so ﬁne-grained at the operational level as either
to prescribe or to prohibit very substantial yet commonplace variations in the
format of democratic self-rule such as parliamentary or presidential systems,
ﬁrst-past-the-post or proportional electoral methods, short or long terms of
ofﬁce, closed or open party lists, and so forth; all such mechanisms are capable
of satisfying the main requirement of democratic legitimacy. Insofar as democratic theory is concerned, the key criterion is thus popular sovereignty, not
any particular instantiation of it.
A second reason why democratic theories typically offer little guidance at the
operational level, particularly as relevant to the structure of candidate nominating
systems, is their historic inattention to the role of political parties. More than 70
years ago, the great twentieth-century political scientist Elmer Schattschneider
called parties “the orphans of political philosophy,”43 and his description remains
apt: “the current literatures on political parties and normative democratic theory
continue to develop to an extraordinary degree in mutual isolation . . . . [M]odern
democratic theory is noticeably silent on the question whether political parties
have a legitimate place and function in a democracy.”44
Indeed, political parties pose a singular challenge to democratic theory.
Parties function as intermediate institutions which, though perhaps pragmatically necessary,45 stand between the people and their elected representatives,
thereby complicating the fulﬁllment of the principal condition of democratic
legitimacy—that rulers must rule subject to some democratically meaningful
form of popular consent. Over time, parties have come to exercise an important function in democratic practice by organizing an otherwise chaotic public
sphere, ﬁlled with differing political views, into an intellectually coherent
environment of ideologically competing partisan positions.46 The party, in
43
44
45

46

E. E. S CHATTSCHNEIDER , P ARTY G OVERNMENT 10 (1942).
Ingrid van Biezen & Michael Saward, Democratic Theorists and Party Scholars: Why They
Don’t Talk to Each Other, and Why They Should, 6 P ERSP . ON P OL . 21, 22 (2008).
Schattschneider famously went so far as to declare that “the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.”
S CHATTSCHNEIDER , supra note 43, at 1.
Theorists as disparate as Downs and Rosenblum agree on this point. See D OWNS , supra note
40, at 25–26; N ANCY L. R OSENBLUM , O N THE S IDE OF THE A NGELS : A N A PPRECIATION OF
P ARTIES AND P ARTISANSHIP 353–56 (2008).
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other words, “coordinates the beliefs and intentions of activists [and] articulates a collective will.”47
Democratic legitimacy requires that the popular will dictate the choice of
rulers. Parties, however, by deﬁnition comprise only a portion of the electorate. If parties “assist” the electorate in formulating its will by deﬁning the
universe of options before the popular will is authoritatively formed, then it is
not entirely clear that an expression of the popular will formed after parties
have done their work is democratically equivalent to the formation of such
a will in the absence of party intermediation. To put the matter differently, the
role of parties in actively constructing the democratic will lays bare the hard
truth, not always acknowledged by democratic theorists, that a democratic will
is not an antecedently existing object to be discovered through the application
of electoral procedures, but is rather an artifact of those procedures—such
a will, in other words, is in large part constructed by the very procedures used
to determine it.48
C. Infeasibility of Selecting on the Necessary Criteria
Finally, even where democratic theory is capable of producing concrete
institutional prescriptions, it is often far from clear that nominating institutions
can be designed to select candidates on the criteria demanded by the theory.
Suppose, for instance, that Americans were to choose on normative grounds to
accept guidance in their practice of democracy from some kind of theory of
deliberative democracy. The ideal president, in that case, would presumably
need to be not only a skilled, patient, and respectful deliberator him- or herself,
but also someone capable of facilitating and leading normatively desirable
deliberation among different groups, including cabinet ofﬁcials, members of
Congress, interest groups, and the general public.
Fair enough, but how might a nominating system be designed to select
candidates on these qualities? One way, as we have seen, is to place a thumb
on the scale by careful construction of the selectorate. Given the commitments of deliberative theories of democracy, an appropriate selectorate might
thus be comprised of individuals who (1) value the skills of a good deliberative
leader and (2) will be more responsive to appeals from potential candidates

47

48

J ONATHAN W HITE & L EA Y PI , T HE M EANING OF P ARTISANSHIP 85 (2016). In some societies
this role has been formally acknowledged: the German Basic Law, for example, provides that
parties “participate in the formation of the political will of the people.” Const. of Germany,
art. 22(1). To similar effect, see C ONST . OF S WITZERLAND , art. 137; C ONST . OF S PAIN , art. 6.
S. I. B ENN & R. S. P ETERS , P RINCIPLES OF P OLITICAL T HOUGHT 397–99 (1959).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University at Buffalo Libraries, on 02 Aug 2021 at 14:36:30, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108883870.002

30

James A. Gardner

who display those qualities than to appeals from candidates with other kinds of
skills and virtues.
So far, so good. But of whom, then, would the selectorate actually be
comprised? How do we identify individuals qualiﬁed to serve? Would they
require speciﬁc kinds of experience or training? Certainly, the selectorate
would likely have to be a small and exclusive group; the general public is
not known for its great love and respect for genuinely deliberative politics,49
particularly in the current era of partisan polarization. Similar problems arise
under any of the various theories of democracy now in circulation. Suppose
a collective commitment to a theory of protective democracy. To which rights
and liberties would a qualiﬁed candidate have to be committed, and who
decides? How would qualiﬁed members of a selectorate be identiﬁed, and by
whom?
The problem quickly begins to swallow its own tail. Some theories of
democracy, most notably democratic minimalism and associated aggregative
theories, neither expect nor demand broad public participation during the
nomination phase; such theories are satisﬁed by mass popular choice among
whatever set of options may happen to be presented to a passive electorate.50
Other theories, especially developmental and deliberative ones, often express
a robust preference for wider public involvement at every stage of the process.51
Thus, the theories that in principle require the greatest public participation at
the nominating phase require in practice the most speciﬁc and exclusive
selectorates, whereas the theories most readily amenable to practical implementation impose no particular requirements on nominating procedures.
Given the challenges associated with taking useful, concrete guidance from
democratic theory in the design of nominating procedures, I turn to two other
possible methods for guiding presidential nominations along desirable pathways: threshold qualiﬁcations and citizen ethos.
49

50

51

E LIZABETH T HEISS -M ORSE & J OHN R. H IBBING , S TEALTH D EMOCRACY (2002);
J AMES A. G ARDNER , W HAT A RE C AMPAIGNS F OR ? T HE R OLE OF P ERSUASION IN
E LECTORAL L AW AND P OLITICS (2009).
S CHUMPETER , supra note 39, at 260; S CHATTSCHNEIDER , supra note 43, at 53–64; D OWNS ,
supra note 40, at 36–38, 220–37; Thomas E. Mann, Is This Any Way to Pick a President?
Lessons from 2008, in R EFORMING THE P RESIDENTIAL N OMINATION P ROCESS , supra note 24,
at 168.
E.g., Fabio Wolkenstein, A Deliberative Model of Intra-Party Democracy, 24 J. P OL . P HIL . 297
(2016); M IGUEL P ÉREZ -M ONEO , L A SELECCIÓN DE CANDIDATOS ELECTORALES EN LOS
PARTIDOS (2012); Susan E. Scarrow et al., From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation:
The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties, in P ARTIES WITHOUT P ARTISANS :
P OLITICAL C HANGE IN A DVANCED I NDUSTRIAL D EMOCRACIES 130 (Russell J. Dalton &
Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2000).
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IV. OTHER MECHANISMS OF PATH DEPENDENCY

A. Candidate Qualiﬁcations
Another common feature of institutional design capable of inﬂuencing the
qualities of candidates for ofﬁce is the use of constitutional qualiﬁcations and
disqualiﬁcations. These mechanisms represent a classic form of constitutional
self-restraint; they prevent the polity from doing something it might regret—in
this case, electing an unqualiﬁed individual. At the federal level, the U.S.
Constitution establishes qualiﬁcations of age, citizenship, and residency.52
State constitutions typically establish the same three qualiﬁcations for governor, though some add the requirement that governors be qualiﬁed voters,53
a provision that subjects candidates for executive ofﬁce to standard grounds of
disqualiﬁcation applicable to voters, such as disqualiﬁcation for mental
incompetence or felony conviction. In some states, term limit provisions add
an additional disqualiﬁcation for having served some prior period in elected
ofﬁce.54 The earliest state constitutions often contained property qualiﬁcations
as well, but those provisions were gradually relaxed during the Jacksonian era,
and are in any case of dubious constitutionality.55
These kinds of threshold screening requirements, however, do not in
themselves identify qualities that ofﬁceholders must possess in order to be
able to perform the job competently; there is no intrinsic reason why
a foreign-born 34-year-old cannot be as good a president as a native-born 36year-old. Rather, threshold screening requirements serve as proxies for
other qualities on which the polity does place considerable weight—experience and maturity of judgment in the case of age; loyalty to the United
States in the case of citizenship; knowledge of local needs and interests in
the case of residency; and responsiveness to the electorate in the case of
term limits.
The utility of qualiﬁcation provisions, however, seems debatable. First, as
with nominating procedures, the most desirable kinds of screening from the
point of view of democratic theory pose serious difﬁculties of implementation.
52
53
54
55

U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives); art. I, §3, cl. 3 (Senators); art. II, § 1, cl. 5
(President).
E.g., C AL . C ONST ., art. IV, § 2; F LA . C ONST . art. III, § 5.
E.g., C AL . C ONST . art. IV, § 2; C OLO . C ONST . art. IV, § 1.
See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) and Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport
District, 431 U.S. 159 (1977), summarily reversing 329 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 1976) (both reversing
state property qualiﬁcations for non-elective ofﬁces); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state property requirement for voting eligibility in the form of
a poll tax).
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It is no easier to design a threshold qualiﬁcation to screen for commitment to
individual liberty or aggregative or deliberative prowess than it is to design
a nominating procedure to produce the same effect.
Second, threshold qualiﬁcation provisions demonstrate a rather low regard
for voter discernment and self-restraint; they presume that voters are sufﬁciently likely to be tempted by unqualiﬁed candidates to require that the
electorate as a whole be afﬁrmatively disabled from acting on those temptations. Even if that presumption is accurate, however, threshold qualiﬁcations
do nothing to prevent voters from deploying this bad judgment by choosing
inexperienced, immature, disloyal, ignorant, or corrupt candidates who clear
the constitutional minima. Perhaps the most that might be said for qualiﬁcation provisions is that they prevent voters from electing the most egregiously
unqualiﬁed candidates, but even that assumption seems dubious: incompetence seems to be generously distributed in the population, even among
native-born, lifelong residents over 35 years of age. If identifying a pool of
solid, highly competent candidates is the goal, threshold qualiﬁcations perform only minimally useful work.
B. Citizen Ethos
To name citizen ethos as a procedure for screening presidential candidates is
in a sense merely to name the condition of having no screening process at all,
or at least no formal one. But the absence of a formal process for screening
candidates does not mean that no screening criteria exist; it means only that
citizens will base their choices among candidates on internalized, politically
consensual criteria, if any exist; or in the absence of consensus, that citizens
will apply their own personal views of good leadership. Thus, although formal
screening and nominating procedures can inﬂuence the nature of the ultimate choice, they are not the only source of inﬂuence; citizens, as social
beings living in a political community, will also respond to prevailing norms of
politics. These norms, moreover, will not necessarily be dictated by democratic theory or by some other, presumptively authoritative source of formal
principles of governance. Prevailing norms of political choice are just as likely
to have their source in convention or in pragmatic considerations. Perhaps the
leading example is the pre-Franklin D. Roosevelt norm of a two-term limit as
a check on the private ambition of presidential candidates. The strength of this
norm served for more than a century to screen out of the candidate pool
individuals who had already served two terms as president, not because formal
term limits had been imposed by law, but because the prevailing citizen ethos
deterred voters from voting for any candidate who had the effrontery to run for
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a third term. During the period when the two-term norm prevailed, such
candidates would have appeared to the electorate to be guilty of an overweening ambition inconsistent with successful continued service.
Because informal political norms supply the foundations of citizen decisionmaking in electoral politics, they are potentially the most important force for
guiding the nomination of presidential candidates: only individuals whose
qualiﬁcations comport with these norms will be plausible candidates for election. The great difﬁculty with relying on such norms, however, is that they are
not easily controlled, or even inﬂuenced, by law. On the contrary, originating in
what Habermas called the “‘wild’ complex” and “anarchic structure” of civil
society,56 they are vulnerable to social and political movements generated
within civil society largely outside of the formal control of law. Indeed, many
now argue that the main problem with politics in the United States—and,
increasingly, throughout the world—is the deterioration in civil society of longstanding, previously stable norms of democratic citizenship.57
This does not mean that citizen ethos cannot be inﬂuenced by adjustments to legal and political institutions—the two undoubtedly shape one
another in a dialectic process, so that institutional processes are in principle
capable of inducing a kind of civic training. Aristotle, for example, argued
that the kind of rotation in ofﬁce typical of Athenian democracy helped to
produce good rulers because the experience of being ruled taught citizens
valuable lessons about how to rule well, lessons that they could apply when
they later held ofﬁce.58 Much more recently, advocates of instant runoff
voting argue persuasively that something as simple as allowing voters to
indicate second and third choices on the ballot has altered the norms of
political campaigning. When candidates stand to beneﬁt by campaigning for
voters’ lower-ranked votes, they apparently no longer ﬁnd it in their interest
to campaign negatively by smearing and belittling opponents whom some
voters might rank higher. This change in institutional incentives has thus
produced more harmonious electoral campaigns in which candidates stress
their positive attributes rather than their opponents’ negatives so as to avoid
alienating a slice of potential support.59 Such a change in candidate behavior
56
57

58
59

H ABERMAS , supra note 41, at 307.
See, e.g., S TEVEN L EVITSKY & D ANIEL Z IBLATT , H OW D EMOCRACIES D IE (2018);
Jamal Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 I ND . L.J. 93 (2018); Symposium, Is
Democracy in Decline?, 26 J. D EMOC . 5 ff. (2015).
A RISTOTLE , P OLITICS , bk. III, ch. iv, § 14–15, 1277b.
See, e.g., Jessie Van Berkel, Ranked-choice Voting Alters Calculus in Minneapolis, St. Paul
Races, M INNEAPOLIS S TAR -T RIBUNE , Oct. 7, 2017; FairVote, Campaign Civility,
www.fairvote.org/research_rcvcampaigncivility (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
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might in turn generate more positive and less alienated sentiments among
the electorate toward candidates and politicians. In this way, then, welldesigned institutional structures can help “train” citizens to think and
behave in desirable ways.
However, the most common form of pressure on citizen ethos and informal
norms, at least in today’s environment of cheap, easy communication, is
ideological. At the moment, tremendous efforts are being made by communicative means, ﬁnanced by enormous private fortunes, to alter prevailing
social attitudes on a host of issues. Citizen ethos is now precisely the site of
a titanic partisan battle, and for good reason. In addition, the arrival in power of
the Trump Administration may well be providing a strong form of civic
training: by normalizing behavior that conﬂicts radically with previously
prevailing civic and democratic norms, the administration may well succeed
in demolishing those norms and replacing them with others more congenial to
non-democratic practices. Citizen ethos thus may well be by far the most
signiﬁcant battleground, quite possibly the only one that really matters.
V. CONCLUSIONS

Complaints about the low quality of presidential candidates are hardly new.
One of the most astute nineteenth-century observers of American political
institutions, Lord James Bryce, devoted a chapter of his 1893 book to the
subject “Why Great Men Are Not Chosen President.” In Bryce’s view, all
American presidents since Jackson, with the exception of Lincoln and Grant,
had been “intellectual pigmies beside the real leaders of [their] generation.”60
Today, however, the stakes are much higher; unlike in Bryce’s time, the
United States is no longer merely one relatively advanced nation among
many, but the richest and most powerful nation the world has ever known.
The quality of its leadership is of concern not only to Americans, but to
everyone on the planet.
The historical record shows that the procedures used for nominating presidential candidates have undergone signiﬁcant change since the founding,
and presumably could change again. The logic of institutional analysis shows
that the design of nominating systems can inﬂuence strongly the qualities of
candidates who successfully clear its screening procedures. Institutional logic
also suggests that the current trend in nominations of expanding the selectorate to the point where it converges with the electorate tends to nullify the
capacity of the nomination process to channel the choice of nominees along
60

J AMES B RYCE , 1 T HE A MERICAN C OMMONWEALTH 84 (1893).
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any particular axis of decision, no matter how desirable. Instead, convergence
of the selectorate and electorate tends to result in a kind of functional delegation of the criteria of choice to self-appointed individuals, groups, and candidates, who may not fully share the collective norms of democratic practice that
in the end comprise the most signiﬁcant and effective constraint on the
behavior of participants in the nominating process.
At the end of the day, reform of nomination mechanisms may not be the
most effective site in which to invest reform energy. What we may need more
than institutional reform is a systematic effort to renew, justify, and strengthen
democratic norms, an effort that by deﬁnition must take place not in the halls
of legislatures or party bureaucracies, but deep in the terrain of civil society.
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